

The IPv6 Snort Plugin

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Context

- Diploma thesis
- 2011 at Potsdam University
- part of “attack prevention and validated protection of IPv6 networks”



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State ~ 1994

IPv4 Internet:


- Research and Academic Networks
- Known design & implementation errors
- Little experience with protocol security
- No urgency for improvement



State ~ today

IPv6 Internet:

- Research and Academic Networks
- Known design & implementation errors
- Little experience with protocol security
- No urgency for improvement (?)



www.cs.brown.edu/~vint/cerf/

IPv6 Security Issues

- Main IPv6 RFCs from 1995/1998
- ⇒ many years of IPv4 security experience to catch up with
- Many accompanying RFCs and Internet Drafts (IPsec, SEND, RH0 deprecation, RA Guard, ...)
 - Few (yet already old) implementations
 - Very little in end user devices
 - Uncertainty hinders deployment

Attacks Against IPv6





The usual:

- Value ranges
- Fragmentation
- Denial of Service
- Portscans
- Errors in Application Layer

IPv6 specific:

- Variable headers
- Multicast
- Routing
- v4/v6 Transition
- **Autoconfiguration**
- **Neighbor Discovery**

Header Chaining



Design Flaw

Designed in 1994,
same premise as IPv4: secure and trustworthy LAN
⇒ cable LAN in organizational hierarchy

No consideration of:


- WiFi
- mobile usage
- anonymous users

Workstation ~ 1990s



by Mike Chapman

Network Device ~ today



gumstix-based Somniloquy prototype, Yuvraj Agarwal et al.

Local Attacks

Simple Denial of Service:

1. Host Alice starts *Duplicate Address Detection*:
"Anyone using IP X?"
2. Host Eve answers "I have IP X."
3. goto 1

Routing/Man in the Middle:

1. Host Eve sends ICMPv6 Redirect:
"This is router Bob, for *google.com* please use router Eve."

Remote Attacks

- Denial of Service
 - Neighbor Cache Exhaustion
 - Oversized IPv6 Header Chains
 - Excessive Hop-by-Hop Options
- Routing
 - RHO source routing
 - Loop using IPv6 Automatic Tunnels

Attack Collections: THC Toolkit and SI6 Networks' IPv6 Toolkit

Tools/Attacks/Tests for:

- Autoconfiguration DoS
- Neighbor Cache
- Routing/Redirect
- Flood-Attacks
- Multicast Listener Discovery
- DHCPv6
- `implementation6`

Honorable Mention: Scapy

```

p = Ether(src='00:15:2c:c8:b8:80', dst='33:33:00:00:00:01')
/ IPv6(src='fe80::215:2cff:fec8:b880', dst='ff02::1')
/ ICMPv6ND_RA(M=0L, O=0L, routerlifetime=1800)
/ ICMPv6NDOptSrcLLAddr(lladdr='00:15:2c:c8:b8:80')
/ ICMPv6NDOptMTU(mtu=1500)
/ ICMPv6NDOptPrefixInfo(prefix='2001:638:807:3a::', prefixlen=64)

wrpcap('mypacket.pcap', p)

a = rdpcap('autoconf_winxp.pcap')
a[5].psdump('scapy_na.ps', layer_shift=1)

```

Scapy psdump ()

Ethernet

dst 00:e0:81:75:c2:b8
src 00:24:1d:a9:76:51
type 0x86dd

IPv6


version 6L
tc 0L
fl 0L
plen 32
nh ICMPv6
hlim 255
src 2001:db8:12:ab:bd50:f2b8:77e0:4469
dst 2001:db8:12:ab:217:9aff:fe3a:7ca6

ICMPv6 Neighbor Discovery - Neighbor Advertisement

type Neighbor Advertisement
code 0
cksum 0x578
R 0L
S 1L
O 1L
res 0x0L
tgt 2001:db8:12:ab:bd50:f2b8:77e0:4469

ICMPv6 Neighbor Discovery Option - Destination Link-Layer Address

type 2
len 1
lladdr 00:24:1d:a9:76:51



Countermeasures

- Filter known-bad packets
- Show anomalous network activity
- Collect data for correlation and detection

Where to Monitor

Placement at:

- Routers
- Switches
- Packet Filters
- Hosts

Implementation as:

- Stand-alone tool (cf. ndpmon)
- Add-on for existing application
- Operating System module

⇒ High versatility: Intrusion Detection Systems


Target System: Snort 2.9

- Widely used Open Source NIDS
- Filter/inline mode
(*Intrusion Prevention System*)
- Plugin APIs
- Decoder for common tunnel protocols




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Snort Packet Processing Overview



Decoding



Decoding Result: struct _Packet

```

typedef struct _Packet
{
    const DAQ_PktHdr_t *pkth;           // packet meta data
    const uint8_t *pkt;                // raw packet data

    EtherARP *ah;
    const EtherHdr *eh;                /* standard TCP/IP/Ethernet/ARP headers */
    const VlanTagHdr *vh;

    const IPHdr *iph, *orig_iph;       /* and orig. headers for ICMP_*_UNREACH */
    const IPHdr *inner_iph;           /* if IP-in-IP, this will be the inner */
    const IPHdr *outer_iph;          /* if IP-in-IP, this will be the outer */

    uint32_t preprocessor_bits;        /* flags for preprocessors to check */
    uint32_t preproc_reassembly_pkt_bits;

    uint8_t ip_option_count;          /* number of options in this packet */
    uint8_t tcp_option_count;
    uint8_t ip6_extension_count;
    uint8_t ip6_frag_index;

    IPOptions ip_options[MAX_IP_OPTIONS];
    TCPOptions tcp_options[MAX_TCP_OPTIONS];
    IP6Extension ip6_extensions[MAX_IP6_EXTENSIONS];

    // ...
} Packet;

```

Rule Engine

Example detection rule:

```
var EXTERNAL_NET any
var SMTP_SERVERS [192.0.2.123, 2001:db8:12:ab::123]

alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $SMTP_SERVERS 25 (
  flow:to_server,established;
  content: "|0A|Croot|0A|Mprog";
  metadata:service smtp;
  msg:"SMTP sendmail 8.6.9 exploit";
  reference:bugtraq,2311;reference:cve,1999-0204;
  classtype:attempted-user;
  sid:669; rev:9;
)
```

IPv6 Support

technically yes, but ...

All major IDS have IPv6 support.

What does that mean?

- Fragment reassembly
- TCP & UDP decoding ⇒ upper-layer checks
- Decoder-warning on severe protocol errors

Not:

- check extensions (Routing Headers, Jumbograms)
- support all rule options (`fragbits`)
- IPv6 specific detection (ICMPv6/Neighbor Discovery)

IPv6 Signatures

Existing rules work for IPv4 and IPv6

No keywords for IPv6-only fields, no IPv6-only rules provided

```

alert ip icmp any -> any any \
  (msg:"IPv6 ICMP Echo-Request?"; itype:128; \
  classtype:icmp-event; sid:2000001; rev:1;)

```


Good for application layer checks

Bad for protocol layer detection

⇒ need to develop a IPv6-Plugin

Snort Customizations

- Writing rules
- Dynamic Detection API: compiled rule evaluations
- Dynamic Preprocessor API:
 - add rule options
 - do something with a packet



New IPv6 Rule Options

Goal: Provide IPv6 access for signatures

- Basic Header
- Extension Headers
- Neighbor Discovery Options

Functionality:

- Handler for option parsing on config (re-)load
- Callbacks for option keywords
- Called with rule parameter and current packet
- Return `match/no_match`

Implementation

```

// IPv6_Rule_Init() reads rule "ipv: 6;" into IPv6_RuleOpt_Data

int IPv6_Rule_Eval(void *raw_packet, const u_int8_t **cursor, void *data)
{
    SFSnortPacket *p = (SFSnortPacket*) raw_packet;
    struct IPv6_RuleOpt_Data *sdata = (struct IPv6_RuleOpt_Data *) data;

    switch (sdata->type) {
        case IPV6_RULETYPE_IPV: {
            uint_fast8_t ipv = GET_IPH_VER(p);
            if (checkField(sdata->op, ipv, sdata->opt.number))
                return RULE_MATCH;
            else
                return RULE_NOMATCH;
        }
        // ...
    }
}

```

IPv6 Rule Options


```

alert icmp any any -> any any (itype:8;  ipv: 4; \
  msg:"ICMPv4 PING in v4 pkt"; sid:1000000; rev:1;)
alert icmp any any -> any any (itype:8;  ipv: 6; \
  msg:"ICMPv4 PING in v6 pkt"; sid:1000001; rev:1;)

alert icmp any any -> any any (itype:128; ipv: 4; \
  msg:"ICMPv6 PING in v4 pkt"; sid:1000002; rev:1;)
alert icmp any any -> any any (itype:128; ipv: 6; \
  msg:"ICMPv6 PING in v6 pkt"; sid:1000003; rev:1;)

```

Resulting Evaluation Tree



Rule Options of the IPv6-Plugin

<code>ipv</code>	IP version
<code>ip6_tclass</code>	Traffic Class
<code>ip6_flow</code>	Flow Label
<code>ip6_exthdr</code>	Extension Header
<code>ip6_extnum</code>	Num. of Ext Hdrs.
<code>ip6_ext_ordered</code>	Ext Hdrs. correctly ordered (bool)
<code>ip6_option</code>	Destination-/HbH-Option
<code>ip6_optval</code>	Destination-/HbH-Option Value
<code>ip6_rh</code>	Routing Header
<code>icmp6_nd</code>	Neighbor Discovery (bool)
<code>icmp6_nd_option</code>	Neighbor Discovery Option

(Most rules accept comparison operators = ! < >)

More Examples

```

alert ip any any -> any any (ip6_rh: !2; \
  msg:"invalid routing hdr"; \
  sid:1000004; rev:1;)

```

```

alert ip any any -> any any (ip6_option: 0.0xc2; \
  msg:"ip6 option: Jumbo in HBH hdr"; \
  sid:100066; rev:1;)

```

```
# event threshold
```

```

alert icmp any any -> any any (icmp6_nd; \
  detection_filter: track by_dst, count 50, seconds 1; \
  msg:"ICMPv6 flooding"; \
  sid:100204; rev:1;)

```

```
# log only one flooding event per second:
```

```

event_filter gen_id 1, sig_id 100204, \
  type limit, track by_src, \
  count 1, seconds 1

```

Preprocessor for Neighbor Discovery Tracking

Goal: monitor network changes

- new hosts
- new routers
- basic extensions/options check

Functionality:

- Reads ICMPv6 messages
- Follows network state, i. e. (MAC, IP) tuple of:
 - On-link routers
 - On-link hosts
 - Ongoing DADs
- Alert on change

Configuration

in `snort.conf`, all optional

<code>net_prefix</code>	subnet prefixes
<code>router_mac</code>	known router MAC addresses
<code>host_mac</code>	known host MAC addresses
<code>max_routers</code>	max routers in state (default: 32)
<code>max_hosts</code>	max hosts in state (default: 8 K)
<code>max_unconfirmed</code>	max unconfirmed nodes in state (default: 32 K)
<code>keep_state</code>	remember nodes for n minutes (default: 180)
<code>expire_run</code>	clean memory every n minutes (default: 20)
<code>disable_tracking</code>	only rules & stateless checks (default: false)


Configuration

“normal use”

```
preprocessor ipv6:
    net_prefix 2001:0db8:1::/64
    router_mac 00:16:76:07:bc:92
```

\
\

Preprocessor State at Runtime



Implementation of NS Processing

```

static void IPv6_Process_ICMPv6_NS(const SFSnortPacket *p, struct IPv6_State *context)
{
    struct nd_neighbor_solicit *ns = (struct nd_neighbor_solicit *) p->ip_payload;
    sfip_t *target_ip;
    struct IPv6_Host *ip_entry;

    target_ip = sfip_alloc_raw(&ns->nd_ns_target, AF_INET6, &rc);
    // ..

    ip_entry = get_host_entry(context->hosts, target_ip);
    if (ip_entry) {
        DEBUG_WRAP(DebugMessage(DEBUG_PLUGIN, "Neighbour solicitation from known host\n"));
        return;
    }

    /* this is the expected part: the IP is yet unknown --> put into DAD state */
    ip_entry = create_dad_entry_ifnew(context->unconfirmed,
                                     &p->pkt_header->ts,
                                     p->ether_header->ether_source,
                                     target_ip);

    if (!ip_entry) {
        DEBUG_WRAP(DebugMessage(DEBUG_PLUGIN, "create_dad_entry_ifnew failed\n"));
        return;
    }
    DEBUG_WRAP(DebugMessage(DEBUG_PLUGIN, "%s DAD started by %s / %s\n",
                             pprint_ts(ip_entry->last_adv_ts),
                             pprint_mac(ip_entry->ether_source),
                             sfip_to_str(&ip_entry->ip)));
    _dpd.alertAdd(GEN_ID_IPv6, SID_ICMP6_ND_NEW_DAD, 1, 0, 3, SID_ICMP6_ND_NEW_DAD_TEXT, 0 );
}

```

Snort IPv6 Alerts: ND Tracking

SID Message


- 1 RA from new router
- 2 RA from non-router MAC address
- 3 RA prefix changed
- 4 RA flags changed
- 5 RA for non-local net prefix
- 6 RA with lifetime 0
- 7 new DAD started
- 8 new host in network
- 9 new host with non-allowed MAC addr.
- 10 DAD with collision
- 11 DAD with spoofed collision

Snort IPv6 Alerts: Packet Attributes

SID Message

- 12 mismatch in MAC/NDP src ll addr.
- 13 extension header has only padding
- 14 option lengths \neq ext length
- 15 padding option data \neq zero
- 16 consecutive padding options

tester.pl



Extremely useful for development.

Verify intended results for given packet samples.

Output/Visualization

- Big Problem
- barnyard2 tool for Snort log processing (e. g. write SQL)
- Few Open Source frontends (BASE & Snorby)
- All using old SQL Schema, without IPv6 field



Performance

Theory:

- Stateless checks require processing
- ND Tracking requires memory \Rightarrow DoS risk

Practice:

- Snort's packet decoding does 90 % of the work
- Configurable memory limit \sim 8 Mb
- TCP stream reassembly is much more expensive

Bugs Found in Snort 2.9.0

or: Real-World Problems of Major Commercial Security Products

- Ping of Death, cannot process > 40 extension headers
- wrong Endianness in `GET_IPH_VER()`
- fragmentation breaks ICMP/UDP checksums
- Routing Headers break ICMP/UDP checksums
- `fragbits` rules not supported

Extension Header Parsing in Snort 2.9.0

fixed in 2.9.1

```

void DecodeIPv6Options(int type, const uint8_t *pkt, uint32_t len, Packet *p)
{
    uint32_t hdrlen = 0;

    if(p->ip6_extension_count < IP6_EXTMAX) {
        switch (type) {
            case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS:
                hdrlen = sizeof(IP6Extension) + (exthdr->ip6e_len << 3);
        }
    }
    /* missing else => hdrlen=0 => infinite mutual recursion */

    DecodeIPv6Extensions(*pkt, pkt + hdrlen, len - hdrlen, p);
}

void DecodeIPv6Extensions(uint8_t next, const uint8_t *pkt, uint32_t len, Packet *p)
{
    switch(next) {
        case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS:
        case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS:
        case IPPROTO_ROUTING:
        case IPPROTO_AH:
            DecodeIPv6Options(next, pkt, len, p);
            return;
    }
}

```

Conclusion

- It works!
- Dynamic Library (no need to recompile Snort)
- Enables IPv6-specific detection signatures
- Snort & IPv6-Plugin detects THC attacks
- Cannot solve fundamental problems: DoS and insecure Ethernet
- **Can** raise visibility and awareness of network threat situation

Contact

E-Mail: `info@mschuette.name`

Project Page: `http://mschuette.name/wp/snortipv6/`

Source Code: `https://github.com/mschuett/spp_ipv6`

Questions?