

Active Directory Security Best Practices

"Top 11 Security Mistakes in Active Directory and How to Avoid Them" Friedwart Kuhn & Heinrich Wiederkehr



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Agenda

- o Who We Are
- o Intro
- Top 11 Security Mistakes in Active Directory and How to Avoid Them



Who We Are

- o Friedwart Kuhn
 - Head of Microsoft Security Team @ERNW
 - 15+ years experience in security assessments, administration, publications and trainings
 - IT security professional with a focus on Windows Security and Active Directory Security

- o Heinrich Wiederkehr
 - Member of Microsoft
 Security Team @ERNW
 - 5+ years in security assessments and trainings
 - IT security professional with a focus on Windows Security and Active Directory Security









Active Directory Assessment Tool

- o Creates security transparency in complex ADs
- o Identifies technical & organizational issues
- Mitigation recommendations based on a decade of experience in enterprise environments
- Learn more: https://www.ernw-sectools.de/products/





TROOPERS AD Security Track

- Brought together world's most prolific AD security experts
- Unique opportunity to learn and exchange
- o See also
 - https://insinuator.net/2019/04/troopers-chill/
 - https://insinuator.net/2019/03/the-mmm-in-community/







Intro

- As main authentication backend Active Directory (AD) holds the keys to the crown jewels in nearly *every* organization.
- AD is heavily targeted by attackers that are using powerful, publicly available tool sets.
- Defense of AD environments often overlooks some typical design, implementation, configuration and operational mistakes.
- We focus on eleven typical 'mistake areas' and we describe how to avoid or fix them.




Mistake No. 1: Lack of AD Governance

https://www.microsoft.com/mspress/books/sampchap/3173.aspx

The Problem: Lack of AD Governance

- o Large enterprise ADs are
 - o Historically grown
 - Distributed over different regions, companies, cultures
 - o Built up and administered in different ways
- This is generally even true for a big AD of one company in one region...
- Enterprises claim to have IT governance, but they usually do not have AD governance









The Solution: Dedicated AD Governance

- o Tasks of the AD Governance Board
 - Govern high-level security & design controls
 - Have an idea of an overall Target AD Design
 - **Provide** organizational and technical guidance such as:
 - How to implement Admin Tiers
 - How to implement PAWs
 - Hardening Guidelines for DCs, Servers, Clients, non-Windows members
 - o Etc.
- Members of the Governance Board: at least experienced AD architects, AD security specialists and AD administrators/operators. The CISO should be a member too.

Good AD Governance



Organization's AD




Mistake No. 2: Admins (and Service Accounts) Logging on Everywhere



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	Prov2 Prov1 Org. Prov2 Prov1	
Prov2 Org.		
Prov1 Prov3		






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Result of Mistake 2...

- 1. Bad guy targets workstations en masse
- 2. User running as local admin compromised, bad guy harvests credentials.
- Bad guy starts "credentials crabwalk"
- 4. Bad guy finds host with domain privileged credentials, steals, and elevates privileges
- 5. Bad guy owns network, can harvest what he wants.



This slide is from: Mark Simos, Nicholas DiCola; "TWC: Pass-the-Hash and Credential Theft Mitigation Architectures" $_{12}$









<u>Classify:</u> Every single security principal, system, or application has to be classified as belonging only to one tier




<u>Restrict Logons:</u> Security principals of a higher tier must never log on to a resource on a lower tier (→ Implement logon restrictions)



<u>Restrict Control:</u> Security principals of a lower tier *must never control* resources of a higher tier (→ Implement control restrictions)



• ERNW Control Restrictions vs. Logon Restrictions





Implementation Guidelines

- o Begin with Tier 0
 - Followed by Tier 1 and then Tier 2
- o Use compartments in Tier 1
- Do not let service accounts undermine the Administrative Tier model
- Provide admins with detailed technical guidelines (about the consequences of logon & control restrictions)
- o Expect a long-term project...





Summary

- The most important and comprehensive Active Directory-specific security control with respect to credential theft & reuse
- o Basis for many other technical controls
- o Future (Windows) administration model
- o Requires modification in admin mindset
- Admins will have more accounts and hence higher operational effort
- o Alternatives
 - o None






Mistake No. 3: Using "Dirty Sources"





The Problem: Security Dependencies

 Security dependencies are not always as trustworthy as the object being secured. For example:




The Solution: Clean Source Principle

- Any subject in control of an object is a security dependency of that object
 - The assurances for all security dependencies must be at or above the desired security level of the object itself

Control is transitive! (For example if A controls B and B controls C, then A also indirectly controls C.)

- o Most common areas of control are:
 - o the hardware where systems are installed,
 - o the installation media for the systems,
 - o the architecture and configuration of the system,
 - o and daily operations.












Clean Source Principle: Administration

- Provide a dedicated secure administration environment for sensitive tasks that is protected from Internet attacks and sophisticated threat vectors
 - On an operating system level: Implement Privileged Access Workstations (PAW)
 - On an Active Directory level: Implement Enhanced Security Administration Environment (ESAE) and/or PRIV Forest(s)

Clean Source Principle: PAWs

- o PAW hardware profiles can be:
 - Dedicated hardware
 - Separate dedicated devices for user tasks vs. administrative tasks
 - Simultaneous use
 - Single device that can run user tasks and administrative tasks concurrently by taking advantage of OS or presentation virtualization. For example:
 - o Adding a local user VM
 - Adding RemoteApp, RDP, or a VDI

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






Clean Source Principle: ESAE/PRIV Forest

- o Dedicated administrative forest
 - o Hosts administrative accounts, workstations, groups
 - Environment has stronger security controls than the production environment
- **ESAE forest** moves all sensitive objects for Tier 0 administration to a separate forest
 - Except the krbtgt account and most likely service accounts
 - Balance between security benefit and operational effort unfavourable in a 1:1 relationship
 - Much better if one ESAE forest is used for multiple productive forests
- PRIV forest moves administrative identities for Tier 1 & 2 administration to a separate forest and combines this with a PAM solution (e.g. MIM 2016)




Production Forest





Exemplary Secure Administration Environment Models

- Prerequisite: Admin Tiering must be implemented
- Option 1:
 - Tier 0 managed exclusively via PAWs
- \circ Option 2:
 - Tier 0 managed by a Local ESAE Forest (utilizing PAWs)
- Option 3:
 - Tier 0 managed by a Global ESAE Forest (utilizing PAWs; used for management of multiple forests)
- **Optional**: Combining the administration model with a PRIV Forest









Mistake No. 4: (AD) Borders Not Under Control








The Problem: AD Borders Neither Well-defined Nor Controlled: Trusts

- Trusts are established without a (security) assessment of the trusted party
- o Often too many trusts
- o Trusts are "too open"
- o Established trusts persist over many years
- Configuration errors: Privileged accounts of the trusted forest have a privileged group membership in the trusting forest
- Trusts can be mapped with *Directory Ranger*
 - https://insinuator.net/2018/12/directoryranger-1-1-0-introducesinformational-audit-checks/









Trusted Domain

Trusting Domain



The Solution: AD Border & Trust Management

- o Be reluctant to and sparse with AD Trusts
- Perform a security assessment of the trusted AD *before* establishing the Trust...
 - ...and know your own vulnerabilities ;-)
- o Configure Trusts preferably:
 - o Uni-directional
 - With Selective Authentication
- Ensure that high privileged accounts span *only* their home AD Domain
- o Review Trusts at least every six months
- Create a Trust Policy with that content ;-)
- o See also
 - https://www.ernw.de/download/ERNW_Whitepaper67 _ADTrustConsiderations.pdf





Mistake No. 5: Best Practices Lost in Time



The Problem: Basics Are Overlooked

- Many AD security best practices exist for many years, but seem to be forgotten
 - Affects technical as well as operational controls
- o Most often seen in assessments:
 - Missing or outdated documentation
 - o Insufficient network separation
 - Misconfiguration of the AdminSDHolder object
 - o Orphaned AD objects
 - Delegation of permission underrepresented







The Solution: Do the Basics

- Complete Documentation
 - Alignment with real configuration
 - Ensures protection and accurate view on the current state of the environment
 - Allows new personnel to become familiar with the environment in case of personnel shortages (e.g. illness)

• Network Isolation

- Network infrastructure (physical) should reflect AD infrastructure (logical)
 - Avoid flat network structures
- Network boundaries can be Forests or Administrative Tiers



AdminSDHolder Object

- Container object in the domain directory partition
- Security descriptor of this object is used as a template for all protected groups and users (e.g. Domain Admins)
 - If descriptors differ they are overwritten with those of the AdminSDHolder object
- The descriptor on this object should only be changed if absolutely necessary
 - Otherwise a new vector for a complete AD compromise is added

Active Directory Users and Computers

The Solution: Do the Basics

- o AD Clean-up Process
 - Implement a process that takes care of:
 - Orphaned user accounts (from personnel which left the company)
 - Orphaned computer objects (from decommissioned systems)
 - Obsolescent group memberships

• AD Delegated Permissions

- Allows delegating permissions without adding users to privileged groups
- Grants users or groups only the permissions they need
- Available via the Microsoft Management Console (MMC)







Mistake No. 6: Too Many and Too Privileged Service Accounts



The Problem: Overabundance of Service Accounts

- Not all service accounts are "real" service accounts
 - Sometimes **misused** as **personal accounts**
- o Most of the time passwords never expire
 - o Often in combination with weak passwords
- o Service accounts often over-privileged
 - Typical example: service accounts member of Domain Admins group

Usually one of the first targets of an attacker





The Solution: Service Account House Keeping

- o Regularly check service accounts for validity
 - Remove all unneeded and pseudo service accounts
- **Remove** the "**Password never expires**" flag on as many service accounts as possible
- Make more service accounts (Group) Managed Service Accounts
- **Remove** unnecessary **privileges** from service accounts
 - Utilize Active Directory Delegated Permissions
 - Utilize **Temporary Group Membership** feature of Server 2016





Mistake No. 7: Too Many Admins

The Problem: Over-privileged Accounts

- o Users often receive admin rights too easily
 - Locally, as well as in AD
 - Combined with missing role separation
- Service accounts also affected (see mistake no. 6)
- Active Directory Delegated Permissions rarely used
 - Instead focus on built-in groups
 - Prevents granular modification of rights
- Existing privileges not regularly checked

- Some numbers from various assessments:
- Example Domain I:
 - Enabled Users: 270
 - High-Priv Users: 49
 - o Ratio: 18,15%
- o Example Domain II:
 - Enabled Users: 1223
 - High-Priv Users: 150
 - o Ratio: 12,26%







The Solution: Remove Privileges

- o Make more users standard users
 - Grant permissions as granularly as possible, so you do not end up with hundreds of Domain Admins ;)
 - (Regularly) validate necessity for admin privileges
 - Local administrative privileges should only be granted in exceptional cases, as they are harder to manage
- o Fix busted applications
 - Legacy software often falsely requires admin privileges
 - Can often be easily fixed (e.g. with Microsoft Application Compatibility Toolkit)





Mistake No. 8: Using Bad Passwords




The Problem: Bad Policies & User Awareness

- Password policies in enterprises are often outdated
 - Do not reflect current threats and technological advances
- Often only user accounts in focus, but not service accounts (e.g. passwords never expire)
- o Users often have a wrong idea of secure passwords
 - Hard to remember for humans but easy to guess for computers
- May seem obsolete in the age of Pass-the-Credential attacks
 - Still relevant for an attacker aiming for a privilege escalation

Policy	Setting		
Enforce password history	6 passwords remembered		
Maximum password age	35 days		
Minimum password age	0 days		
Minimum pessword length	6 characters		
Password must meet complexity requirements	Disabled		
Store passwords using reversible encryption	Disabled		
Account Policies/Account Lockout Policy			
Policy	Setting		
Account lockout duration	0 minutes		
Account lockout threshold	3 invalid logon attempts		

99999 minutes

Reset account lockout counter after







Example I

```
Authentication Id: 0; 105200145 (0000000:06453a11)
                : RemoteInteractive from 4
Session
User Name
                : [Redacted]
Domain
                : [Redacted]
                : [Redacted]
msv :
[00000003] Primary
* Username
                : [Redacted]
* Domain
                : [Redacted]
* NTLM
                : 620f8ec4fa8c78198eed1986b3c53b9c
* SHA1
                : 9542adc5ed3f05f0b5758a7f97d8963e05354990
        wdigest :
         * Username: [Redacted]
         * Domain : [Redacted]
                                          Really?
         * Password : October
```

- If users can they will choose a password, which fulfils the bare minimum
- If they have to change their password too often they try to work around it
 - You most probably can guess the other passwords of this user ;)

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Example II

- Authentication Id: 0; 219681182 (0000000:0d18119e) Session : RemoteInteractive from 20 User Name : [Redacted] Domain : [Redacted] SID : [Redacted] msv : [00000003] Primary * Username : [Redacted] * Domain : [Redacted] * NTLM : 3d8695acdd1747fa3f42e1fe4659a8f0 * SHA1 : 50ab0e0504673f043e9b1fcdb7e0eb1af9cd0d5e wdigest : * Username: [Redacted] * Domain : [Redacted] **Better**? * Password : #Au20G08
- Might seem to be a better password at a first glance
- o But:
 - Hard to remember
 - o Only 8 characters
 - NTLM hash can be cracked in a few minutes with rainbow tables





The Solution: Update Password Policies

- Length > Complexity
 - Easier to remember
 - o Can have a longer lifetime
 - Lockout thresholds can be higher
- All of this increases the acceptance and reduces operational overhead

- For standard users:
 - Use the Default Domain Policy
- For high-privileged & admin accounts:
 - Use Fine-Grained Password Policies
- For Service Accounts:
 - Use Fine-Grained Password Policies
 - Utilize (g)MSAs or implement a manual password reset mechanism
- For local (admin) accounts:
 - Utilize a management solution such as LAPS
 - Do not use GPPs!









Recommended Password Requirements

Туре	Min Age	Max Age	Min Length	History	Complexity Requirements	Lockout Threshold	
Standard Users	1 day	180 days	12 characters	5 passwords	Yes	15 logon attempts	
Admin Accounts	1 day	90 days	18 characters	10 passwords	Yes	10 logon attempts	
Service Accounts	1 day	180 days	32 characters	20 passwords	Yes	20 logon attempts	
Local Admin Accounts	1 day	30 days	18 characters	20 passwords	Yes	20 logon attempts	
KRBTGT	Regular password resetting procedure every three months						



Mistake No. 9: Running Outdated Operating Systems



The Problem: Outdated Operating Systems

- o A no-brainer for an attacker attacking EoL OS
 - (Security) patches no longer released by the vendor
 - Exploits are some times even publically available
- Not a no-brainer, but a problem: outdated but still vendor-supported operating system versions
 - Legacy protocols
 - o Insecure authentication mechanisms
 - o Lack of modern, state-of-the-art security features





The Solution: Use Modern Operating System Versions

- o Upgrade to new operating system versions,
- o Substitute outdated systems,
- o Decommission End-of-Life systems
 - o If not possible: Isolation for example in an EoL Forest
 - o Overall security-level should not be lowered
 - Creation of a separated environment for outdated systems
 - See also:
 - https://static.ernw.de/whitepaper/ERNW_Newsletter _47_Security_Concept_for_End-of-Life_Windows_Servers_signed.pdf
- o <u>Be aware of</u>: Installation of new operating systems not enough
 - New operating system security features must also be actively used





The Solution: Use Modern Operating System Features

- Modern OS provide a lot of credential theft/reuse specific technologies
- o Windows 8.1 / Server 2012 R2-specific security features
 - o Authentication Policies & Silos
 - LSA Protection
 - Restricted Admin Mode for RDP
- o Windows 10 / Server 2016-specific security features
 - o Measured Boot and Remote Attestation
 - o Virtualization-based Security
 - Device Guard
 - o Credential Guard
 - Microsoft Passport





Mistake No. 10: Vulnerable Systems and Applications Everywhere





The Problem: Insufficient Patch Management

- Both operating system and third-party components often not up-to-date
- Regular patches and out-ofband patches both affected
 - Especially critical for OOB patches
- Usually insufficient or even no patch management at all





The Solution: Patch and Vulnerability Management

- Implementation of a proper patch and vulnerability management process for maintaining the overall security of a system
- Implement controlled patching of operating system components **and** third-party software
 - Ensure an appropriate patching time frame
- Define update procedures for security-critical (OOB) out-of-band patches guarantee roll-out in a timely manner





The Solution: Patch and Vulnerability Management

- o Operating system patches are released monthly
 - Easy planning
 - Should be rolled out within a week
- o Application patches are released irregularly
 - A lot harder to plan for
 - Utilize security advisories and bulletins
 - Should be rolled out within three weeks
- o OOB patches must be seen as emergency changes
 - Should be rolled out within 48 hours





Mistake No. 11: No Active Directory-Specific Security Logging & Monitoring

The Problem: No AD-Specific Security Logging & Monitoring

- AD-specific logging & monitoring is often restricted to AD service functionality (e.g. replication)
- Windows security monitoring often deferred to AV functionality (e. g. "AV will detect a compromise...")
- Even if configured, security logs are not analyzed or are only analyzed in case of emergency
- Credential theft & reuse are often very difficult to detect.









The Solution: AD-Specific Security Logging & Monitoring

- o Do the basics
 - (1) Centralized logging & monitoring
 - (2) Define three Windows audit policies:
 - A baseline policy for all Windows servers
 - A high security policy for high secure systems (Tier 0 & some Tier 1 systems (e. g. SAP), VIPs)
 - A very thorough audit policy in case of assumed compromise and for investigation cases
 - (3) Acquire or ,hire' AD monitoring know-how and allocate resources and personnel







The Solution: AD-Specific Security Logging & Monitoring

- o Implement Admin Tiers with logon & control restrictions and monitor violations
 - Begin with Tier 0
 - Then Tier 1 & VIPs
- o Monitor at least:
 - Tier 0 logons (and logon failures)
 - High privileged group membership changes
 - Violations of allowed logon types (e.g. interactive logon of service accounts)
 - o Changes of attributes for sensitive AD objects (e. g. AdminSDHolder object)
 - Violations of allowed Kerberos encryption algorithms
 - Large amounts of enumeration errors
 - Some specific kerberos events IDs on DCs (e. g. ID 7 and ID 4769)
 - Yara rules for mimikatz & wce specific usage & strings







Thank you for your time!



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
www.insinuator.net



Sources

o <u>Link1</u>

- Ross Anderson, Security Engineering
- o Icons
 - <u>https://icons8.com/</u>





Additional Material & Information

Clean Source Principle: Installation

- Ensure that the installation media has not been tampered with
 - Requires validating the software integrity throughout the lifecycle including during acquisition, storage, and transfer until usage

- The source of the software must be validated
 - Physical media directly from the vendor
 - File hash validation
 - Revocation checks for digital signatures
- The software must be stored in a location that is protected from modification
 - especially by internet-connected hosts
 - or personnel trusted at a lower level than the systems where the software system will be installed








Control/Logon Restrictions Example 1 for Admin Tiers



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


Control/Logon Restrictions Example 2 for Admin Tiers



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Tier 0 admin manages the identity store (Active Directory database). He can define group membership of Tier 0, Tier 1 (and Tier 2) accounts and he can define security settings for Tier 0 und Tier 1 servers (and even Tier 2 computers) in GPOs.



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DMZ AD

- o Strictly separate internal AD from DMZ AD
- Do not place even RODC (of internal AD) in the DMZ
- The only Trust allowed between an internal AD and a DMZ AD is an uni-directional Trust outgoing from the DMZ AD







The Problem: AD Borders Neither Well-defined Nor Controlled: AD Extension Into the Cloud

- Many different scenarios possible
 - Application services in Azure (WebApp, SharePoint, SQL, SAP...)
 - Domain Controller(s) in Azure (for Backup-up or authentication reasons)
- Some scenarios require synchronization of credentials to Azure



Azure (Cloud)

- Extension of internal AD via DirSync/ADConnect or member systems in Azure should require a strategic decision
- A connection via ADFS between on-prem AD and Azure is able to restrict on-prem credentials to on-prem AD







Exemplary ESAE Forest Implementation

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