



Crashing Cisco's Autonomic Network

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Goal of the presentation

- Security Assessment for a network implementation
- The network is based on a new technology developed by Cisco under the name Autonomic Network
- *It is first work of its kind to analyze a commercial implementation of Autonomic Network*



Expectations

- Understand Autonomic Network, its architecture and how different components work together.
- Reverse engineer Cisco's proprietary Autonomic Network protocol.
- *Multiple vulnerabilities will be for the first time disclosed throughout the presentation*




Agenda

- Introduce Cisco's Autonomic Network
- Discuss Autonomic Network (AN) architecture
- Explain Cisco's deployment for the AN through multiple scenarios
- Reverse engineering AN protocol phases
 - Channel Discovery
 - Adjacency Discovery
 - Secure Channel
- Attacking the network
 - Discover and exploit multiple vulnerabilities




Introduction

- Technology developed in the IETF under the name ANIMA (Autonomic Networking Integrated Model and Approach)
- Based on the Autonomic Computing Systems approach developed by IBM which introduced Self-managing Systems.



General Overview


- Network control point, simply known as registrar
- Enrollee, can be a new device or an already working device
- Certificate Authority (either local or external)



Enrollee



Registrar






Live Demo

Demo Results

- There is no need to configure any command on the greenfield devices
- Only a single command needs to be configured on the brownfield devices



Autonomic Network Architecture



Scenario 1: Single Registrar with a Local CA

- Autonomic registrar configuration mode
- Domain name for the registrar
- Node acts as both CA and a registrar
- Enabling both CA and registrar functions
- Enabling autonomic functions

```
autonomic registrar  
domain-id ERNW.de  
CA local  
no shut  
autonomic
```

Scenario 1: Single Registrar with a Local CA

- 3072-bit RSA key for the CA is generated
- CA root certificate is generated



Scenario 1: Single Registrar with a Local CA

- Unique Device Identifier, is a combination of device model and serial number, e.g: PID:ISR4321/K9 SN:FDO2018A0M8
- 3072-bit key is generated
- Registrar becomes aware of its domain name
- Registrar generates its domain ID



Interface MAC Address

Device number
within the domain

Scenario 1: Single Registrar with a Local CA

- Registrar sends to the CA its UDI, domain name, domain ID and public key to acquire a domain certificate

```
Certificate:
  Data:
    Version: 3 (0x2)
    Serial Number: 2 (0x2)
    Signature Algorithm: sha512WithRSAEncryption
    Issuer:
      commonName = ioscs RA
    Validity
      Not Before: Jan 2 15:00:12 2017 GMT
      Not After : Jan 2 15:00:12 2018 GMT
    Subject:
      serialNumber = PID:ISR4321/K9 SN:FD02018A0M8 + organizationalUnitName
= ERNW.de
      commonName = 0062.ec9d.8060-1
    Subject Public Key Info:
      Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
      Public-Key: (3072 bit)
```

Scenario 1: Single Registrar with a Local CA


- After receiving its domain certificate from the CA
- Registrar creates cisco_autonomic VRF



[Cisco.com](https://www.cisco.com)

Scenario 1: Single Registrar with a Local CA

- Registrar creates new interface under the name loopback100000 and adds it to the VRF
- The IPv6 address of the loopback100000 interface is assigned as the following:



Scenario 1: Single Registrar with a Local CA

- 1st phase of AN protocol, Channel Discovery, starts
- Registrar sends out layer 2 probes advertising the presence of autonomic registrar and looking for any new devices supporting autonomic features



Scenario 2: Registrar with a Local CA and a Client

- Once the client receives registrar's layer 2 probes, it responds back
- 2nd phase of AN protocol, Adjacency Discovery, starts
- UDP service which runs on protocol 4936

Scenario 2: Registrar with a Local CA and a Client

Client Side

- 2) Current Domain & UDI
- 5) Request Domain Certificate
- 7) Security parameters negotiation

Registrar Side

- 1) Domain announcement
- 3) Whitelist check
- 4) Domain and CA certificates
- 6) New issued certificate
- 8) Acknowledgment

Scenario 2: Registrar with a Local CA and a Client


- Secure Channel protection mechanism:
 - DIKE on UDP port 5000 (preferred)
 - IPSec on UDP port 500 (backwards compatibility)



Autonomic Network Features


- Autonomic Control Plane (i.e.: loopback100000 interface)
 - Self-configuring
 - Self-protection
 - Self-healing





Scenarios Summary


 Generate RSA 3072
 key pair



AN Protocol Analysis

- Wireshark is used to capture packets between the ISR4321 nodes

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000	00:62:ec:9d:80:60	ISL-Frame_cd:cd:dc	LLC	118	U, func=UI; SNAP, OUI 0x00000C (Cisco), PID 0x88EF
2	0.014104	00:00:00_00:00:01	ISL-Frame_cd:cd:dc	LLC	148	U, func=UI; SNAP, OUI 0x00000C (Cisco), PID 0x88EF
3	11.680271	00:00:00_00:00:01	ISL-Frame_cd:cd:dc	LLC	159	U, func=UI; SNAP, OUI 0x00000C (Cisco), PID 0x88EF
4	21.678386	00:62:ec:9d:80:60	ISL-Frame_cd:cd:dc	LLC	212	U, func=UI; SNAP, OUI 0x00000C (Cisco), PID 0x88EF
5	21.678411	00:62:ec:9d:80:60	ISL-Frame_cd:cd:dc	LLC	148	U, func=UI; SNAP, OUI 0x00000C (Cisco), PID 0x88EF
6	24.384456	00:62:ec:9d:80:60	ISL-Frame_cd:cd:dc	LLC	1436	U, func=UI; SNAP, OUI 0x00000C (Cisco), PID 0x88EF
7	24.384480	00:62:ec:9d:80:60	ISL-Frame_cd:cd:dc	LLC	1365	U, func=UI; SNAP, OUI 0x00000C (Cisco), PID 0x88EF
8	24.506508	00:00:00_00:00:01	ISL-Frame_cd:cd:dc	LLC	1436	U, func=UI; SNAP, OUI 0x00000C (Cisco), PID 0x88EF
9	24.506526	00:00:00_00:00:01	ISL-Frame_cd:cd:dc	LLC	153	U, func=UI; SNAP, OUI 0x00000C (Cisco), PID 0x88EF
10	26.502154	00:62:ec:9d:80:60	ISL-Frame_cd:cd:dc	LLC	1213	U, func=UI; SNAP, OUI 0x00000C (Cisco), PID 0x88EF
11	28.727965	00:62:ec:9d:80:60	ISL-Frame_cd:cd:dc	LLC	596	U, func=UI; SNAP, OUI 0x00000C (Cisco), PID 0x88EF
12	30.621816	00:62:ec:9d:80:60	ISL-Frame_cd:cd:dc	LLC	596	U, func=UI; SNAP, OUI 0x00000C (Cisco), PID 0x88EF

AN Protocol Analysis

- Reverse engineering tools: netzob
- Registrar layer 2 announcements

```

      00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
0000  01 00 0c cd cd dc 00 62 ec 9d 80 60 00 68 aa aa .....b...`.h..
0010  03 00 00 0c 88 ef 10 01 00 ff 00 01 00 60 00 00 .....`. ..
0020  00 00 01 00 00 1e 50 49 44 3a 49 53 52 34 33 32 .....PID:ISR432
0030  31 2f 4b 39 20 53 4e 3a 46 44 4f 32 30 31 38 41 1/K9 SN:FD02018A
0040  30 4d 38 00 02 00 00 14 47 69 67 61 62 69 74 45 0M8....GigabitE
0050  74 68 65 72 6e 65 74 30 2f 30 2f 30 03 00 00 00 thernet0/0/0....
0060  04 00 00 02 00 00 05 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 06 00 .....
|0070  00 04 00 00 00 08

```


AN Protocol Analysis

- Network protocol types:
 - Text-based

```
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15  
  
0000 47 45 54 20 2f 64 6f 77 6e 6c 6f 61 64 2e 68 74 GET /download.ht  
0010 6d 6c 20 48 54 54 50 2f 31 2e 31 0d 0a 48 6f 73 ml HTTP/1.1..Hos  
0020 74 3a 20 77 77 77 2e 65 74 68 65 72 65 61 6c 2e t: www.ethereal.  
0030 63 6f 6d 0d 0a 55 73 65 72 2d 41 67 65 6e 74 3a com..User-Agent:  
0040 20 4d 6f 7a 69 6c 6c 61 2f 35 2e 30 20 28 57 69 Mozilla/5.0 (Wi  
0050 6e 64 6f 77 73 3b 20 55 3b 20 57 69 6e 64 6f 77 ndows; U; Window  
0060 73 20 4e 54 20 35 2e 31 3b 20 65 6e 2d 55 53 3b s NT 5.1; en-US;  
0070 20 72 76 3a 31 2e 36 29 20 47 65 63 6b 6f 2f 32 rv:1.6) Gecko/2  
0080 30 30 34 30 31 31 33 0d 0a 41 63 63 65 70 74 3a 0040113..Accept:
```

AN Protocol Analysis

- Network protocol types:
 - Binary-based

	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	
0000	00	00	c0	9f	a0	97	00	a0	cc	3b	bf	fa	08	00	45	10;....E.
0010	00	4f	16	a9	40	00	40	06	a2	9c	c0	a8	00	02	c0	a8	.0..@.@.....
0020	00	01	04	e6	00	17	04	53	d8	70	c0	40	87	cf	80	18S.p.@....
0030	7d	78	79	0a	00	00	01	01	08	0a	00	16	0a	27	00	05	}xy.....'..
0040	4b	63	ff	fd	03	ff	fb	18	ff	fb	1f	ff	fb	20	ff	fb	Kc..... ..
0050	21	ff	fb	22	ff	fb	27	ff	fd	05	ff	fb	23				!..."..'.....#

AN Protocol Analysis

- Binary protocols encoding formats:
 - Fixed fields

00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07

0000 13 48 13 48 00 8f 89 5a |.H.H...Z

Octet	0								1								2								3							
Bits	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
32	Source port																Destination port															
64	Length																Checksum															

UDP header

AN Protocol Analysis

- Binary protocols encoding formats:
 - Variable-sized fields (Type-length-value)

	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	
0000	02	05	ee	68	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	...h.....
0010	00	00	00	64	00	01	00	0c	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	0f	...d.....
0020	00	04	00	08	0c	04	01	02								

AN Protocol Analysis

- Looking on our frame, which encoding format does it follow ?

```

00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
0000  01 00 0c cd cd dc 00 62 ec 9d 80 60 00 68 aa aa .....b...`.h..
0010  03 00 00 0c 88 ef 10 01 00 ff 00 01 00 60 00 00 .....`. ..
0020  00 00 01 00 00 1e 50 49 44 3a 49 53 52 34 33 32 .....PID:ISR432
0030  31 2f 4b 39 20 53 4e 3a 46 44 4f 32 30 31 38 41 1/K9 SN:FD02018A
0040  30 4d 38 00 02 00 00 14 47 69 67 61 62 69 74 45 0M8....GigabitE
0050  74 68 65 72 6e 65 74 30 2f 30 2f 30 03 00 00 00 thernet0/0/0....
0060  04 00 00 02 00 00 05 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 06 00 .....
0070  00 04 00 00 00 08

```

Type-Length-Value

AN Protocol Analysis

- Ethernet header formats

6 bytes	6 bytes	2 bytes	Till 1500 bytes	
Destination MAC Address	Source MAC Address	EtherType	Payload	FCS

Ethernet II

6 bytes	6 bytes	2 bytes	1 byte	1 byte	1 byte	Till 1500 bytes	
Destination MAC Address	Source MAC Address	Frame Length	DSAP	SSAP	Control	Payload	FCS

**802.3
(802.3, 802.2 LLC)**

6 bytes	6 bytes	2 bytes	1 byte	1 byte	1 byte	3 bytes	2 bytes	Till 1500 bytes	
Destination MAC Address	Source MAC Address	Frame Length	DSAP	SSAP	Control	OUI	Protocol ID	Payload	FCS

**802.3
(802.3, 802.2 SNAP)** 30

AN Protocol Analysis

- Channel Discovery frame analysis

	Destination MAC Address	Source MAC Address	Frame Length	SNAP Frame
	00 01 02 03 04 05	06 07 08 09 10 11	12 13 14 15	
0000	01 00 0c cd cd dc	00 62 ec 9d 80 60	00 68	aa aab...` .h..
0010	03 00 00 0c 88 ef	10 01 00 ff 00 01	00 60 00 00` ..
0020	00 00 01 00 00 1e	50 49 44 3a 49 53	52 34 33 32PID:ISR432
0030	31 2f 4b 39 20 53	4e 3a 46 44 4f 32	30 31 38 41	1/K9 SN:FD02018A
0040	30 4d 38 00 02 00	00 14 47 69 67 61	62 69 74 45	0M8.....Gigabite
0050	74 68 65 72 6e 65	74 30 2f 30 2f 30	03 00 00 00	thernet0/0/0....
0060	04 00 00 02 00 00	05 00 00 04 00 00	00 00 06 00
0070	00 04 00 00 00 08		

AN Protocol Analysis

- Channel Discovery frame analysis

Organization Unique Identifier

AN Protocol ID

	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	
0000	01	00	0c	cd	cd	dc	00	62	ec	9d	80	60	00	68	aa	aab...`h..
0010	03	00	00	0c	88	ef	10	01	00	ff	00	01	00	60	00	00`..
0020	00	00	01	00	00	1e	50	49	44	3a	49	53	52	34	33	32PID:ISR432
0030	31	2f	4b	39	20	53	4e	3a	46	44	4f	32	30	31	38	41	1/K9 SN:FD02018A
0040	30	4d	38	00	02	00	00	14	47	69	67	61	62	69	74	45	0M8.....GigabitE
0050	74	68	65	72	6e	65	74	30	2f	30	2f	30	03	00	00	00	thernet0/0/0....
0060	04	00	00	02	00	00	05	00	00	04	00	00	00	00	06	00
0070	00	04	00	00	00	08										

AN Protocol Analysis

- Channel Discovery frame analysis

Octet	0								1								2								3							
Bits	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
32	Version				Reserved				State								Factory Default															
64	Operation Code																Length															
96	Reserved																															
128	TLV (Options)																															

AN Channel Discovery Header

AN Protocol Analysis

- Channel Discovery frame analysis

	Version = 1, reserved = 0					State					Factory Default					Operation Code				
	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15				
0000	01	00	0c	cd	cd	dc	00	62	ec	9d	80	60	00	68	aa	aab...`h..			
0010	03	00	00	0c	88	ef	10	01	00	ff	00	01	00	60	00	00`..			
0020	00	00	01	00	00	1e	50	49	44	3a	49	53	52	34	33	32PID:ISR432			
0030	31	2f	4b	39	20	53	4e	3a	46	44	4f	32	30	31	38	41	1/K9 SN:FD02018A			
0040	30	4d	38	00	02	00	00	14	47	69	67	61	62	69	74	45	0M8....GigabitE			
0050	74	68	65	72	6e	65	74	30	2f	30	2f	30	03	00	00	00	thernet0/0/0....			
0060	04	00	00	02	00	00	05	00	00	04	00	00	00	00	06	00			
0070	00	04	00	00	00	08													

AN Protocol Analysis

- Channel Discovery frame analysis

Opcode Value	Significance
0x0001	Registrar/Enrollee announcement
0x0002	Receiver reply for the announcement
0x0003	Sender acknowledgment for the reply
0x0004	Keepalive probes

AN Protocol Analysis

- Channel Discovery frame analysis

	Header Length	Reserved	Type	Length
	00 01 02 03	04 05 06 07	08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15	
0000	01 00 0c cd	cd dc 00 62	ec 9d 80 60 00 68	aa aab...` .h..
0010	03 00 00 0c	88 ef 10 01 00 ff	00 01 00 60 00 00` ..
0020	00 00 01 00	00 1e 50 49 44 3a	49 53 52 34 33 32PID:ISR432
0030	31 2f 4b 39	20 53 4e 3a 46 44	4f 32 30 31 38 41	1/K9 SN:FD02018A
0040	30 4d 38 00	02 00 00 14 47 69	67 61 62 69 74 45	0M8.....GigabitE
0050	74 68 65 72	6e 65 74 30 2f 30	2f 30 03 00 00 00	thernet0/0/0....
0060	04 00 00 02	00 00 05 00 00 04	00 00 00 00 06 00
0070	00 04 00 00	00 08	

AN Protocol Analysis

- Channel Discovery frame analysis

Option Type	Significance
0x0100	Source UDI
0x0200	Source Interface
0x0300	Receiver UDI
0x0400	2 bytes of zeros
0x0500	4 bytes of zeros
0x0600	4 bytes of value 0x00000008

AN Protocol Analysis

- Adjacency Discovery phase on port 4936

AD Header
UDP
IPv6
Customized CD Header
Ethernet

```

00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
0000 01 00 0c cd cd dc 00 62 ec 9d 80 60 00 c6 aa aa .....b...`....
0001 03 00 00 0c 88 ef 10 05 00 ff 00 00 00 0e 00 00 .....
0002 00 00 86 dd 60 00 00 00 00 88 11 ff fe 80 00 00 ....`.....
0003 00 00 00 00 02 62 ec ff fe 9d 80 60 ff 02 00 00 .....b.....`....
0004 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 50 13 48 13 48 .....P.H.H
0005 00 88 86 00 20 02 00 ff 00 01 00 80 00 00 00 00 ....
0006 00 01 00 22 50 49 44 3a 49 53 52 34 33 32 31 2f ..."PID:ISR4321/
0007 4b 39 20 53 4e 3a 46 44 4f 32 30 31 38 41 30 4d K9 SN:FD02018A0M
0008 38 00 00 02 00 15 30 30 36 32 2e 65 63 39 64 2e 8.....0062.ec9d.
0009 38 30 36 30 2d 31 00 00 03 00 0c 45 52 4e 57 2e 8060-1.....ERNW.
0010 64 65 00 00 07 00 14 fe 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 de.....
0011 62 ec ff fe 9d 80 60 00 08 00 09 41 4e 49 31 00 b.....`....ANI1.
0012 00 05 00 14 fd b6 67 6a 9a 78 00 00 00 62 ec 9d .....gj.x...b..
0013 80 60 00 01

```


AN Protocol Analysis

- Adjacency Discovery phase on port 4936

```

00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
0000 01 00 0c cd cd dc 00 62 ec 9d 80 60 00 c6 aa aa .....b...`....
0001 03 00 00 0c 88 ef 10 05 00 ff 00 00 00 0e 00 00 .....
0002 00 00 86 dd 60 00 00 00 00 88 11 ff fe 80 00 00 .....
0003 00 00 00 00 02 62 ec ff fe 9d 80 60 ff 02 00 00 .....b.....`....
0004 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 50 13 48 13 48 .....P.H.H
0005 00 88 86 00 20 02 00 ff 00 01 00 80 00 00 00 00 .....
0006 00 01 00 22 50 49 44 3a 49 53 52 34 33 32 31 2f ..."PID:ISR4321/
0007 4b 39 20 53 4e 3a 46 44 4f 32 30 31 38 41 30 4d K9 SN:FD02018A0M
0008 38 00 00 02 00 15 30 30 36 32 2e 65 63 39 64 2e 8.....0062.ec9d.
0009 38 30 36 30 2d 31 00 00 03 00 0c 45 52 4e 57 2e 8060-1.....ERNW.
0010 64 65 00 00 07 00 14 fe 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 de.....
0011 62 ec ff fe 9d 80 60 00 08 00 09 41 4e 49 31 00 b.....`....ANI1.
0012 00 05 00 14 fd b6 67 6a 9a 78 00 00 00 62 ec 9d .....gj.x...b..
0013 80 60 00 01


```



Ethernet 802.3 /802.2 SNAP

AN Protocol Analysis

- Adjacency Discovery phase on port 4936



```

00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
0000 01 00 0c cd cd dc 00 62 ec 9d 80 60 00 c6 aa aa .....b...`....
0001 03 00 00 0c 88 ef 10 05 00 ff 00 00 00 0e 00 00 .....
0002 00 00 86 dd 60 00 00 00 00 88 11 ff fe 80 00 00 .....
0003 00 00 00 00 02 62 ec ff fe 9d 80 60 ff 02 00 00 .....b.....`....
0004 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 50 13 48 13 48 .....P.H.H
0005 00 88 86 00 20 02 00 ff 00 01 00 80 00 00 00 00 .....
0006 00 01 00 22 50 49 44 3a 49 53 52 34 33 32 31 2f ..."PID:ISR4321/
0007 4b 39 20 53 4e 3a 46 44 4f 32 30 31 38 41 30 4d K9 SN:FD02018A0M
0008 38 00 00 02 00 15 30 30 36 32 2e 65 63 39 64 2e 8.....0062.ec9d.
0009 38 30 36 30 2d 31 00 00 03 00 0c 45 52 4e 57 2e 8060-1.....ERNW.
0010 64 65 00 00 07 00 14 fe 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 de.....
0011 62 ec ff fe 9d 80 60 00 08 00 09 41 4e 49 31 00 b.....`....ANI1.
0012 00 05 00 14 fd b6 67 6a 9a 78 00 00 00 62 ec 9d .....gj.x...b..
0013 80 60 00 01

```

Customized CD Header

AN Protocol Analysis

- Adjacency Discovery phase on port 4936

CD Header Field	Value (hex)
Version	1
Reserved	0
State	05
Factory Default	00 ff
Operation Code	00
Length	0e
Reserved	00 00 00 00
Ethertype	86 dd

```


00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
0000 01 00 0c cd cd dc 00 62 ec 9d 80 60 00 c6 aa aa .....b...`....
0001 03 00 00 0c 88 ef 10 05 00 ff 00 00 00 0e 00 00 .....
0002 00 00 86 dd 60 00 00 00 00 88 11 ff fe 80 00 00 .....
0003 00 00 00 00 02 62 ec ff fe 9d 80 60 ff 02 00 00 .....b.....`....
0004 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 50 13 48 13 48 .....P.H.H
0005 00 88 86 00 20 02 00 ff 00 01 00 80 00 00 00 00 .....
0006 00 01 00 22 50 49 44 3a 49 53 52 34 33 32 31 2f ..."PID:ISR4321/
0007 4b 39 20 53 4e 3a 46 44 4f 32 30 31 38 41 30 4d K9 SN:FD02018A0M
0008 38 00 00 02 00 15 30 30 36 32 2e 65 63 39 64 2e 8.....0062.ec9d.
0009 38 30 36 30 2d 31 00 00 03 00 0c 45 52 4e 57 2e 8060-1.....ERNW.
0010 64 65 00 00 07 00 14 fe 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 de.....
0011 62 ec ff fe 9d 80 60 00 08 00 09 41 4e 49 31 00 b.....`....ANI1.
0012 00 05 00 14 fd b6 67 6a 9a 78 00 00 00 62 ec 9d .....gj.x...b..
0013 80 60 00 01

```

Customized CD Header

AN Protocol Analysis

- Adjacency Discovery phase on port 4936



```


00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
0000 01 00 0c cd cd dc 00 62 ec 9d 80 60 00 c6 aa aa .....b...`....
0001 03 00 00 0c 88 ef 10 05 00 ff 00 00 00 0e 00 00 .....
0002 00 00 86 dd 60 00 00 00 00 88 11 ff fe 80 00 00 .....
0003 00 00 00 00 02 62 ec ff fe 9d 80 60 ff 02 00 00 .....b.....`....
0004 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 50 13 48 13 48 .....P.H.H
0005 00 88 86 00 20 02 00 ff 00 01 00 80 00 00 00 00 .....
0006 00 01 00 22 50 49 44 3a 49 53 52 34 33 32 31 2f ..."PID:ISR4321/
0007 4b 39 20 53 4e 3a 46 44 4f 32 30 31 38 41 30 4d K9 SN:FD02018A0M
0008 38 00 00 02 00 15 30 30 36 32 2e 65 63 39 64 2e 8.....0062.ec9d.
0009 38 30 36 30 2d 31 00 00 03 00 0c 45 52 4e 57 2e 8060-1.....ERNW.
0010 64 65 00 00 07 00 14 fe 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 de.....
0011 62 ec ff fe 9d 80 60 00 08 00 09 41 4e 49 31 00 b.....`....ANI1.
0012 00 05 00 14 fd b6 67 6a 9a 78 00 00 00 62 ec 9d .....gj.x...b..
0013 80 60 00 01

```

IPv6 Header

AN Protocol Analysis

- Adjacency Discovery phase on port 4936




```

00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
0000 01 00 0c cd cd dc 00 62 ec 9d 80 60 00 c6 aa aa .....b...`....
0001 03 00 00 0c 88 ef 10 05 00 ff 00 00 00 0e 00 00 .....
0002 00 00 86 dd 60 00 00 00 00 88 11 ff fe 80 00 00 .....
0003 00 00 00 00 02 62 ec ff fe 9d 80 60 ff 02 00 00 .....b.....`....
0004 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 50 13 48 13 48 .....P.H.H
0005 00 88 86 00 20 02 00 ff 00 01 00 80 00 00 00 00 .....
0006 00 01 00 22 50 49 44 3a 49 53 52 34 33 32 31 2f ..."PID:ISR4321/
0007 4b 39 20 53 4e 3a 46 44 4f 32 30 31 38 41 30 4d K9 SN:FD02018A0M
0008 38 00 00 02 00 15 30 30 36 32 2e 65 63 39 64 2e 8.....0062.ec9d.
0009 38 30 36 30 2d 31 00 00 03 00 0c 45 52 4e 57 2e 8060-1.....ERNW.
0010 64 65 00 00 07 00 14 fe 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 de.....
0011 62 ec ff fe 9d 80 60 00 08 00 09 41 4e 49 31 00 b.....`....ANI1.
0012 00 05 00 14 fd b6 67 6a 9a 78 00 00 00 62 ec 9d .....gj.x...b..
0013 80 60 00 01

```

UDP Header



AN Protocol Analysis

- Adjacency Discovery phase on port 4936

Octet	0								1								2								3							
Bits	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
32	Version				Reserved				State								Factory Default															
64	Operation Code																Length															
96	Reserved																															
128	TLV (Options)																															

AN Adjacency Discovery Header


AN Protocol Analysis

- Adjacency Discovery phase on port 4936

```

00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
0000 01 00 0c cd cd dc 00 62 ec 9d 80 60 00 c6 aa aa .....b...`....
0001 03 00 00 0c 88 ef 10 05 00 ff 00 00 00 0e 00 00 .....
0002 00 00 86 dd 60 00 00 00 00 88 11 ff fe 80 00 00 .....
0003 00 00 00 00 02 62 ec ff fe 9d 80 60 ff 02 00 00 .....b.....`....
0004 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 50 13 48 13 48 .....P.H.H
0005 00 88 86 00 20 02 00 ff 00 01 00 80 00 00 00 00 .....
0006 00 01 00 22 50 49 44 3a 49 53 52 34 33 32 31 2f ..."PID:ISR4321/
0007 4b 39 20 53 4e 3a 46 44 4f 32 30 31 38 41 30 4d K9 SN:FD02018A0M
0008 38 00 00 02 00 15 30 30 36 32 2e 65 63 39 64 2e 8.....0062.ec9d.
0009 38 30 36 30 2d 31 00 00 03 00 0c 45 52 4e 57 2e 8060-1.....ERNW.
0010 64 65 00 00 07 00 14 fe 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 de.....
0011 62 ec ff fe 9d 80 60 00 08 00 09 41 4e 49 31 00 b.....`....ANI1.
0012 00 05 00 14 fd b6 67 6a 9a 78 00 00 00 62 ec 9d .....gj.x...b..
0013 80 60 00 01

```




Version = 2, reserved = 0

State

AN Protocol Analysis


- Adjacency Discovery phase on port 4936



State Value	Significance
0x02	Multicast, Neighbor Discovery hello packets
0x03	Unicast, Bootstrap phase
0x04	Unicast, negotiating secure channel parameters

AN Protocol Analysis

- Adjacency Discovery phase on port 4936




```

00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
0000 01 00 0c cd cd dc 00 62 ec 9d 80 60 00 c6 aa aa .....b...`....
0001 03 00 00 0c 88 ef 10 05 00 ff 00 00 00 0e 00 00 .....
0002 00 00 86 dd 60 00 00 00 00 88 11 ff fe 80 00 00 .....
0003 00 00 00 00 02 62 ec ff fe 9d 80 60 ff 02 00 00 .....b.....`....
0004 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 50 13 48 13 48 .....P.H.H
0005 00 88 86 00 20 02 00 ff 00 01 00 80 00 00 00 00 .....
0006 00 01 00 22 50 49 44 3a 49 53 52 34 33 32 31 2f ..."PID:ISR4321/
0007 4b 39 20 53 4e 3a 46 44 4f 32 30 31 38 41 30 4d K9 SN:FD02018A0M
0008 38 00 00 02 00 15 30 30 36 32 2e 65 63 39 64 2e 8.....0062.ec9d.
0009 38 30 36 30 2d 31 00 00 03 00 0c 45 52 4e 57 2e 8060-1.....ERNW.
0010 64 65 00 00 07 00 14 fe 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 de.....
0011 62 ec ff fe 9d 80 60 00 08 00 09 41 4e 49 31 00 b.....`....ANI1.
0012 00 05 00 14 fd b6 67 6a 9a 78 00 00 00 62 ec 9d .....gj.x...b..
0013 80 60 00 01

```





AN Protocol Analysis

- Adjacency Discovery phase on port 4936

Opcode Value	Significance
0x0001	Neighbor Discovery Domain packets
0x0003	Whitelist acceptance/rejection for the requesting nodes
0x0004	Device Domain Certificate
0x0005	Bootstrap invite by the registrar
0x0007	Bootstrap reply by the enrollee
0x0008	Device Domain Certificate (rarely used)
0x0019	Negotiating available security parameters for the secure channel
0x001a	Acknowledgment on the agreed security parameters


AN Protocol Analysis

- Adjacency Discovery phase on port 4936

```

00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
0000 01 00 0c cd cd dc 00 62 ec 9d 80 60 00 c6 aa aa .....b...`....
0001 03 00 00 0c 88 ef 10 05 00 ff 00 00 00 0e 00 00 .....
0002 00 00 86 dd 60 00 00 00 00 88 11 ff fe 80 00 00 .....
0003 00 00 00 00 02 62 ec ff fe 9d 80 60 ff 02 00 00 .....b.....`....
0004 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 50 13 48 13 48 .....P.H.H
0005 00 88 86 00 20 02 00 ff 00 01 00 80 00 00 00 00 .....
0006 00 01 00 22 50 49 44 3a 49 53 52 34 33 32 31 2f ..."PID:ISR4321/
0007 4b 39 20 53 4e 3a 46 44 4f 32 30 31 38 41 30 4d K9 SN:FD02018A0M
0008 38 00 00 02 00 15 30 30 36 32 2e 65 63 39 64 2e 8.....0062.ec9d.
0009 38 30 36 30 2d 31 00 00 03 00 0c 45 52 4e 57 2e 8060-1.....ERNW.
0010 64 65 00 00 07 00 14 fe 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 de.....
0011 62 ec ff fe 9d 80 60 00 08 00 09 41 4e 49 31 00 b.....`....ANI1.
0012 00 05 00 14 fd b6 67 6a 9a 78 00 00 00 62 ec 9d .....gj.x...b..
0013 80 60 00 01

```




Header Length

Factory Default

AN Protocol Analysis


- Adjacency Discovery phase on port 4936



```


00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
0000 01 00 0c cd cd dc 00 62 ec 9d 80 60 00 c6 aa aa .....b...`....
0001 03 00 00 0c 88 ef 10 05 00 ff 00 00 00 0e 00 00 .....
0002 00 00 86 dd 60 00 00 00 00 88 11 ff fe 80 00 00 .....
0003 00 00 00 00 02 62 ec ff fe 9d 80 60 ff 02 00 00 .....b.....`....
0004 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 50 13 48 13 48 .....P.H.H
0005 00 88 86 00 20 02 00 ff 00 01 00 80 00 00 00 00 .....
0006 00 01 00 22 50 49 44 3a 49 53 52 34 33 32 31 2f ..."PID:ISR4321/
0007 4b 39 20 53 4e 3a 46 44 4f 32 30 31 38 41 30 4d K9 SN:FD02018A0M
0008 38 00 00 02 00 15 30 30 36 32 2e 65 63 39 64 2e 8.....0062.ec9d.
0009 38 30 36 30 2d 31 00 00 03 00 0c 45 52 4e 57 2e 8060-1.....ERNW.
0010 64 65 00 00 07 00 14 fe 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 de.....
0011 62 ec ff fe 9d 80 60 00 08 00 09 41 4e 49 31 00 b.....`....ANI1.
0012 00 05 00 14 fd b6 67 6a 9a 78 00 00 00 62 ec 9d .....gj.x...b..
0013 80 60 00 01

```



AN Protocol Analysis

- Adjacency Discovery phase on port 4936



Operation Codes	Available field types	Fields Significance
0x0001	0x0001	Source UDI
	0x0002	Source Device Domain ID
	0x0003	Domain Name
⋮	⋮	⋮
0x0019	0x0001	Security Channel Protection Mode, either DIKE or IPSEC
0x001a	0x0001	Acknowledgment on the agreed Security Mode

AN Protocol Analysis


- Secure Channel phase
- DIKE, Data-Internet Key Exchange V2, port 5000
- IPSEC, IP Secure, port 500

Any Ideas?

Secure Channel
UDP
IPv6
Customized CD Header
Ethernet

AN Protocol Analysis

- Secure Channel phase
- Supports AN since 2014
- DIKE only supported on newer operating Systems
- IPSec NULL



ME 3600X-24CX-M




- ▶ Frame 1567: 150 bytes on wire (1200 bits), 150 bytes captured (1200 bits) on interface 0
- ▶ Ethernet II, Src: CiscoInc_9b:97:c4 (44:e4:d9:9b:97:c4), Dst: CadmusCo_b1:bd:bc (08:00:27:b1:bd:bc)
- ▶ Internet Protocol Version 6, Src: fe80::46e4:d9ff:fe9b:97c4, Dst: fe80::1
- ▶ Encapsulating Security Payload
- ▶ Generic Routing Encapsulation (IPv6)
- ▶ Internet Protocol Version 6, Src: fe80::46e4:d9ff:fe9b:979c, Dst: ff02::2
- ▶ Internet Control Message Protocol v6

0000	08 00 27 b1 bd bc 44 e4	d9 9b 97 c4 86 dd 60 00	..!...D.\.
0010	00 00 00 60 32 ff fe 80	00 00 00 00 00 00 46 e4	... 2...F.
0020	d9 ff fe 9b 97 c4 fe 80	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0030	00 00 00 00 00 01 19 c1	5b f5 00 00 01 38 00 00 [....8..
0040	86 dd 60 00 00 00 00 1c	3a ff fe 80 00 00 00 00	.. \..... :.....
0050	00 00 46 e4 d9 ff fe 9b	97 9c ff 02 00 00 00 00	..F.....
0060	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 02 9b 01 45 83 00 15 E...
0070	01 00 18 55 00 00 fd 0a	7c 9c df 87 00 00 00 1e	...U...
0080	bd c8 3a 00 00 02 01 02	02 2f 21 99 8d d2 d2 03	:..... ./!.....
0090	60 3f 6e b1 2d a3		?n.-.

AN Protocol Testing

- Whitelist
- Malicious user tries to get unauthorized access or hinder the network performance
- What search function is used to search in the list?
e.g.: grep of the Unix systems

```
Registrar#more flash:whitelist.txt  
PID:ISR4321/K9 SN:FD02018A0M9  
PID:ISR4321/K9 SN:FD02018A0M8  
PID:ISR4321/K9 SN:FD01845A00F
```





Live Demo



Demo Results

- Autonomic Network registrars can not handle neither space nor null as an enrollee UDI
- CVE-2017-3849
- CSCvc42717: Cisco IOS and IOS XE Software Autonomic Networking Infrastructure Registrar Denial of Service Vulnerability

AN Protocol Testing

- Adjacency Discovery packets specifically crafted
- Unexpected types within the packets
- Unexpected values assigned to the types





Live Demo

Demo Results

- Specifically crafted Adjacency Discovery packets can cause the ISR4321 to reload
- Details will be published in couple of days on insinuator.net

AN Protocol Testing

- No need for autonomic services to be running on the device
- You only need a reachable IPv6 address to crash the routers, that's all!



By World IPv6 Day (Internet Society)



Live Demo

Demo Results

- There is no need for autonomic services to be enabled to crash ISR4321
- All what is needed is just the IPv6 address regardless of being link-local or global
- CVE-2017-3050
- CSCvc42729: Cisco IOS and IOS XE Software IPv6 Denial of Service Vulnerability

Conclusion

- Smart network where nodes can manage themselves
- Channel Discovery, Adjacency Discovery, Secure Channel
- Vulnerable to null/space as UDIs
- Vulnerable to unexpected fields within the packets
- Denali 16.2.1 and 16.3.1 operating systems (IOS XE) can be crashed using only their IPv6 address



© Can Stock Photo

Finally...

- There are **more vulnerabilities** to announce and disclose, everything will be there on insinuator.net
- 3-part series about Autonomic Network on insinuator.net
 - Introduction
 - Analysis
 - Vulnerabilities
- I would like to thank [Marc Heuse](#) for his contributions with protocol analysis



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