



# Exploring North Korea's Surveillance Technology

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## Disclaimer

- We never visited DPRK
  - What we say about DPRK is mostly speculation or
  - based on publications of others.
- This is not about making fun of them
  - Not about the developers ...
  - ... and certainly not about the people of DPRK
- No focus on security in this talk -> Privacy

## Agenda

- Introduction
- Surveillance
- Censorship
- Conclusions

## Motivation

- Shed some light on repressive technology, even in 2017
- Overview of technical abilities to perform
  - Surveillance of their citizens
  - Censorship on a large scale
- Lack of public, in-depth research about technology by DPRK
- Disclosure to the public of potential surveillance and censorship

## Previous Research

- Research done by us
  - Lifting the fog on Red Star OS (32C3)
  - Woolim: Lifting the fog on DPRK's latest tablet PC (33C3)

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- Research done by others
  - Multiple publications concerning Red Star OS security (@hackerfantastic)
  - Art based on our Red Star OS research: Inter Alias ([www.interalias.org](http://www.interalias.org))
  - Compromising Connectivity: Information Dynamics between the State & Society in a Digitizing North Korea - U.S.-Korea Institute (USKI) at SAIS

## Modern Devices in a Repressive State

- DPRK started at around ~2000
- PCs, tablet PCs, mobile phones
- The problem: devices allow
  - access to media (photos, videos, audio),
  - sharing of media files and
  - potentially access information from outside of DPRK.
- Potential solutions:
  - Surveillance: tracking the distribution of unwanted/impure media
  - Censorship: prevent the distribution of unwanted/impure media





## Red Star OS

Tracking the distribution of media files



## Red Star OS


- Different leaked versions
  - Server (3.0) and Desktop (2.0 (and 2.5?) and 3.0)
  - We focused on Desktop 3.0
- General purpose desktop system based on Fedora and KDE
  - Look and Feel of Mac OS X
  - Email client, calendar, word processor, media player...
- Latest package builds in 2013
- Public leak in December 2014















Original

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
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

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Second User

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## Tracking the Distribution of Media Files



User 1




no-spy.jpg

## Tracking the Distribution of Media Files



User 1



User 2




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
## Tracking the Distribution of Media Files



User 1



User 2



User 3




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
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User 2



User 3




Government




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## Tracking the Distribution of Media Files



# Tracking the Distribution of Media Files

- Create social networks
- Construct connections between dissidents
- Track down sources that create/import media files
- Shutdown dissidents/traitors



## Problems with Red Star OS Watermarking

- Only affects media files
  - No binaries/applications -> users can install software
- Not really sophisticated
  - Can be removed/bypassed easily
- “AntiVirus” could prevent distribution of certain files
- Watermarking only allows to track the distribution of media
  - Does not prevent distribution of media



# Woolim

Prevent the distribution of media files

## Woolim

- Name of a waterfall in DPRK
- Manufacturer: Hoozo (Z100) from China
- Similar products sell for ~180€ to ~260€ online
- Software from/modified by DPRK
- System Information
  - Allwinner A33 (ARMv7) SoC
  - 8GB SK Hynix flash
  - MicroSD and power plug
- Android 4.4.2 with Kernel 3.4.39
- Connectivity only available via dongles (no WIFI/Bluetooth built-in)




## Woolim is More Restrictive

- Introduces file signatures
  - Using asymmetric cryptography (RSA)
  - Goal: **PREVENT** the distribution of media files




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  - Absolute control over media sources




## Exploring “This is not signed file.”

- Introduces file signatures
  - Using asymmetric cryptography (RSA)
  - Goal: **PREVENT** the distribution of media files
- Government has full control over signatures
  - Absolute control over media sources
- Explicit signature checks on Woolim
  - Apps have to take care of checks
  - Unlike Red Star OS's kernel module




## Signature Checking

- Java interface with native JNI library
  - Called by apps e.g. during file opening/saving
  - Sometimes concealed as “license checks”




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  - **NATISIGN**: Files signed by the government
  - **SELSIGN**: Files signed by the device itself



## Signature Checking

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  - **NATISIGN**: Files signed by the government
  - **SELSIGN**: Files signed by the device itself
- Files without proper signatures cannot be opened
  - By apps that do signature checks





# Java Native Interface Libraries

- Check if file has a proper signature
- Used by various applications, e.g.:
  - FileBrowser.apk
  - Gallery2.apk
  - Music.apk
  - PackageInstaller.apk
  - PDFViewer.apk
  - RedFlag.apk
  - SoundRecorder.apk
  - TextEditor.apk

```
7 package gov.no.media.natsign;
8
9
10 public class MnsNative
11 {
12
13     public MnsNative()
14     {
15     }
16
17     public static native void getIMEIandIMSI(String s, String s1);
18
19     public static native int getNatSignInfoLen(String s, int ai[]);
20
21     public static native int isMagicCorrect(String s, int ai[]);
22
23     public static native int isNatSignFile(String s, int ai[]);
24
25     public static native void saveKeyToFile(byte abyte0[], int i);
26
27     public static native void savePatternToFile(byte abyte0[], int i);
28
29     public static native void saveSelfKeyToFile(byte abyte0[], int i);
30
31     private static final boolean D = true;
32     public static final String TAG = "MnsNative";
33
34     static
35     {
36         System.loadLibrary("medianatsign");
37     }
38 }
```




## NATISIGN

- Files that have been approved by the government
  - Also referred to as “gov\_sign”
- Files are signed with a 2048 bit RSA key
- Device holds the public key to verify signatures
  - Deployed on the device (0.dat)
- Code does some additional obfuscation
  - Probably to make manual signing harder



## SELSIGN'ing

- Combination of
  - Symmetric encryption (Rijndael 256)
  - Asymmetric signatures (RSA)
  - Hashing (SHA224/SHA256)
- Device identity stored in legalref.dat
  - Comprised of IMEI and IMSI
  - Each device's „legal reference“
- Files created on the device itself can be opened
  - Camera images, office documents, PDFs, etc.



[illegible]


## Files Types Affected by Signing

- All kinds of media files
- Text and HTML files
- Even APKs...

```
public static String extensions[] = {  
    "3g2", "3gp", "aac", "xlsx", "xml", "ac3", "amr", "ape", "apk", "asf",  
    "avc", "avi", "awb", "bmp", "cda", "dat", "divx", "doc", "docx", "dts",  
    "flac", "flv", "gif", "htm", "html", "ifo", "jpeg", "jpg", "m4a", "m4b",  
    "m4p", "m4r", "m4v", "mid", "midi", "mka", "mkv", "mmf", "mov", "mp2",  
    "mp2v", "mp3", "mp4", "mpa", "mpc", "mpeg", "mpeg4", "mpg", "ofr", "ogg",  
    "ogm", "pcx", "pdf", "png", "ppt", "pptx", "ra", "ram", "rm", "rmvb",  
    "rtf", "smf", "swf", "tga", "tif", "tiff", "tp", "ts", "tta", "txt",  
    "vob", "wav", "wma", "wmv", "wv", "xls", "3gpp", "jps", "cwdx", "csdx",  
    "cpdx", "odt", "ods", "odp"  
};
```



## Absolute Control of Woolim's Media Sources






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
Approved by the government



NATISIGN




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




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


## Network-level Surveillance and Censorship

- Network is controlled by the government
- No Internet access for most users
- Route all traffic over central nodes/proxies
- Only a few government-owned Certificate Authorities

## Human-level Surveillance

- Woolim includes TraceViewer
  - Take screenshots of apps
  - Records browser history
- Random physical inspections of mobile devices
  - Ranging from school teachers to members of special security units
  - Could identify inappropriate usage within minutes
- Prevents hiding impure files in removable media
  - Detecting inappropriate use is still possible if media will be removed
- Recorded histories and screenshots cannot be removed





# Conclusions

## Surveillance and Censorship

# Surveillance and Censorship on Multiple Levels

- Network level
  - Government-controlled network
- Device level
  - Track distribution of media files via watermarks and signatures
  - Prevent distribution of media files with signatures
- Human level
  - Take screenshots and record browser histories
  - Make them easily accessible for random inspections via TraceViewer

## How the Implementations Evolved



Red Star OS  
2013

- Simple watermarking applied to media files
- Code for advanced watermarking (e.g. for audio filters) available, but not used.



Ryonghung  
~2013

- Ported version of Red Star OS watermarking code (lots of similarities)
- Experimental version of signature checking available.



Woolim  
~2015

- Same Red Star OS compatible code, but not used.
- Only advanced signature checking used



## Thanks for Supporting our Research

- slipstream/RoL (@TheWack0lian)
  - For leaking the Red Star OS ISOs
- Will Scott (@willscott)
  - For translations and other information
- Iltaek
  - Translations
- ISFINK ([www.isfink.org](http://www.isfink.org))
  - Freedom of Information in North Korea
  - Provided the tablet(s) -> Big thank you!

## Future Work

- Dump of multiple devices (tablets and smartphones)
  - We don't have access to these devices
- AntiVirus software
- Anybody got a smartphone from DPRK?
- Anybody got software from DPRK?
- “signed XP”?

→ We would love to take a look at more technology from DPRK!

Thank you for your Attention!



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